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FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE IMMIGRATION AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
FILINDo

B. MASINO t

FUNDAMENTALLY, JURISDICTION over immigration derives
from article six of the Constitution, which declares that the
Constitution and the laws of the United States which are made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under
the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land.
The authority to regulate the admission and expulsion of aliens
is found in the power inherent in a sovereign state to protect itself.
This regulatory authority over aliens is also found in the specific
constitutional power given to Congress in article one to regulate
commerce with foreign nations which includes the travel and transportation of persons. Such authority is recognized and limited by
clause one of section nine of that article which declares that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the then existing States
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior
to the year 1808. It necessarily follows that the States have no substantial power over these matters. By the same token, Congress,
exercising the right of national sovereignty, may enact legislation
providing the conditions and qualifications for the admission of aliens
into the United States and designating what classes shall be apprehended
and deported. Such laws provide express authority to the responsible
administrative agencies to prescribe regulations to enforce the provisions of the statute; and regulations which are reasonable and consistent with the intent and purpose of the statutes have the force of
law.'
The authority of the courts in this field stems from three constitutional provisions: (1) the fifth amendment which provides that
"no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law"; (2) article three which declares that the judicial power
of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
t Assistant Attorney General of Pennsylvania; formerly National President, Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers.
1. Manhattan Gen. Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
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establish; and (3) the further provision that the judicial power shall
extend to all cases of law and equity arising under the Constitution,
the laws of the United States and treaties made under their authority.
It may here be mentioned that under the same provisions Congress
has vested the District Courts with the power to issue writs of habeas
corpus.' Congress has also vested the courts with jurisdiction "in a
case of actual controversy

.

.

.

[to] declare the rights and other

legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be sought," and "such declaration shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and be reviewable
as such." ' In addition to this general jurisdiction to make declaratory
judgments, Congress has also vested the courts with specific jurisdiction
to grant declaratory judgments in case any person claims a right or
privilege as a national of the United States and he is denied such right
or privilege by any department or agency, or executive official thereof,
on the ground that he is not a national of the United States."
The courts adjusted their duty to support the Constitution and
laws made thereunder by ruling that Congress has the power to exclude
any alien for any reason" or deport any alien for any reason;' that
the immigration statutes by enumerating conditions upon which permission to land may be denied prohibits denial in other cases; 7 that
the applicant for admission shall have a fair hearing; ' that as part of
due process of law no alien is to be deported without having been given
opportunity to be heard upon the question involving his right to be
and remain in the United States, 9 even though he is not entitled to
due process to the extent that applies in the case of a person being tried
on the charge of the commission of a crime; 10 and that the decisions
of immigration officers are conclusive upon matters of fact,' where the
orders of exclusion or deportation are supported by evidence. 12 By
these holdings the courts have assured that no alien will be excluded
or deported who is not within the class which Congress prescribed
by law. Otherwise, the way would be left open for executive officers to
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 452 (1952).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1952).
4. Nationality Act of 1940, 54 SrAT. 1171, 8 U.S.C. § 903 (1952) ; Immigration and
Nationality Act, 66 STAT. 273, 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1952).
5. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).

6. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
7. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9 (1915).
8. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908).
9. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903).
10. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
11. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915).
12. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
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exclude or deport aliens upon grounds created solely by executive officers
without authority of law. Such activity would be executive usurpation
of a legislative function.
It should also be noted that a striking distinction is made by the
courts between persons applying for admission on the ground of
citizenship and those resisting deportation for the same reason. In the
first class of cases the courts have ruled that the administrative decision
is final if a hearing meeting all the requirements of due process of law
was granted and the excluding decision was based on substantial
evidence.l' In the second class the ruling is that if there is a substantial
claim of citizenship, the courts will try the case de novo on questions
of fact as well as the law involved. 4 In this latter class of cases a
declaratory judgment of citizenship is often given."
Exclusion and deportation may now be resisted by habeas corpus,
or declaratory judgment, or petition for review under the Administrative
Procedure Act. The deportation proceeding is civil in nature " and
not a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the fifth and sixth
Therefore, deportation is not a
amendments to the Constitution.'
punishment for crime. 8 However, in effecting deportation, the rights
that exist in "due process of law" may not be disregarded; and an
alien, although alleged to be illegally in this country, may not be taken
into custody and deported without first being accorded a hearing on
his right to be and remain in the United States.
The hearing, though summary, must be fair and in good faith.' 9
To meet the fundamental requisites of a fair hearing it has been generally held that
(a) the course of the proceeding shall be appropriate to the
case and just to the party affected;
(b) the accused shall be notified of the nature of the charge
against him in time to meet it;
(c) he may have the advice and assistance of counsel of his
own choice and at his own expense, if he so desires;
(d) he may have the time and opportunity, after all the
evidence is produced and known to him, to introduce his own
evidence and witnesses to refute it;
13. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908).
14. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
15. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
16. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
17. Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912).
18. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
19. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 458 (1920); Chin Yow v. United
States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908).
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(e) he may, if he chooses, cross-examine witnesses testifying
against him;
(f) the decision shall be governed by and based solely upon
the evidence brought out at the hearing; and
(g) there must be some substantial evidence taken at the
hearing to support the decision.
The rules of evidence to be employed must be within reason and
fairness,2" although those applicable in judicial proceedings need not
be strictly followed. 2 Generally, evidence is admissible if it is relevant
to the issue 22 and the best obtainable.'
In deportation proceedings the burden in all cases is upon the
When United
government to prove alienage 24 and deportability 3
States citizenship is claimed, the burden is upon the claimant after the
government has made out its case. 26 However, administrative officers
are obliged to establish status, that is, alienage or citizenship; 27 and, if
the claim of citizenship is rejected by the administrative agency, the
claimant is entitled to a judicial determination of his status.2
In view of the fifth amendment, an alien who is deprived of his
liberty or who is about to be deported may resort to judicial review of
the proceeding by habeas corpus. Generally in a habeas corpus proceeding based on a deportation case, the court determines whether the
following three elements are present: (1) a fair hearing,2" (2) correct
interpretation of the law, and"0 (3) substantial evidence to support
the order of deportation. 3 '
It is not well settled whether the doctrine of res judicata applies
to the discharge of an alien in habeas corpus proceedings.32 But a
20. Johnson v. Kock Shing, 3 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 558
(1925).
21. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908).
22. Maltez v, Nagle, 27 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1928).
23. Backus v. Owe Sam Goon, 235 Fed. 847 (9th Cir. 1916).
24. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904).
25. 4 Solicitor of Labor File 2983 (Feb. 27, 1932).
26. United States ex rel. Fracassi v. Karnuth, 19 F. Supp. 581 (W.D.N.Y. 1937).
27. Yuen Boy Ming v. United States, 103 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1939).
28. Nationality Act of 1940, § 503, 54 STAT. 1171, 8 U.S.C. § 903 (1952) ; Immigration and Nationality Act, § 360, 66 STAT. 273, 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1952).
29. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939) ; Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per
Azion v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932) ; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922);
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908).
30. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939) ; Gegiow v. Uhl. 239 U.S. 3 (1915).
31. Lloyd Sabuada Societa Anonima Per Azion v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932);
United States ex ret. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927); Zakonaite v.
Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912).
32. Cases holding -thatres judicata does not apply to determinations made in habeas
corpus: Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924) ; United States ex rel. Ket-
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judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties
and subject matter is conclusive and indisputable evidence as to all
rights and questions of law or fact put in issue and adjudicated therein,
83
when the same come again into controversy between the same parties.
Hence, when an alien has already been accorded judicial review of his
deportation case by habeas corpus, he is not entitled to a subsequent
review in a declaratory judgment action. 4
It is well settled that under the doctrine of res judicata a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit between the same
parties on the same cause of action, and that under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel by judgment there is precluded relitigation of issues
actually litigated and determined in a prior suit regardless of whether
it was based on the same cause of action as the second suit. 5 It would
therefore seem that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel by judgment, the Attorney General of the United States may be precluded
from relitigating issues of fact and law actually litigated and determined
in a prior deportation proceeding, even though the Executive Department is not strictly bound by res judicata.
The writ of habeas corpus is unavailable to one who is not actually
in custody, even though he may have good reason to believe that his
arrest is imminent."6 By the same token, one who has been released
on bail 3 7 or parolea may not maintain habeas corpus unless he first
3 9
surrenders to the custody of the immigration officers.
Finally, the alien must exhaust his administrative remedies, and a
final order of deportation must have been issued before the courts will
intervene in a habeas corpus proceeding.4
I

tunen v. Reimer, 79 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1935) ; Linklater v. Perkins, 74 F.2d 473 (D.C.
Cir. 1934) ; United States ex rel. Waldman v. Tod, 289 Fed. 761 (2d Cir. 1923). Contra,
Lui Lum v. United States, 166 Fed. 106 (3d Cir. 1908).
33. Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494 (1932) ; Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 176
F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Oklahoma ex rel. Comm'rs. v. United States, 155 F.2d 496
(10th Cir. 1946) ; Cruz-Sanchez v. Robinson, 136 F. Supp. 53, 55 (S.D. Cal. 1955)
RESTAT MNT, JUDGM NTS § 117 (1942) ; 30 AM. JUR., Judgments § 283, (1940).
34. Cruz-Sanchez v. Robinson, supra note 33.

35. Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1878).
36. Impiriale v. Perkins, 66 F.2d 805 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Doss v. Lindsley, 53 F.
Supp. 427 (E.D. Ill. 1944).
37. Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339 (1920); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564
(1885) ; Sibray v. United States, 185 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1911).
38. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885) ; Van Meter v. Sanford, 99 F.2d 511
(5th Cir. 1938).
39. Sibray v. United Statts, 185 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1911).
40. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) ; United States v.
Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904) ; United States ex rel. Petersen v. Commissioner, 1 F.
Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); United States ex rel. Loucos v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d
473 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
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The courts are in conflict as to whether a petitioner may be released on bail during the pendency of habeas corpus proceedings. In
some jurisdictions, judges deny that they have any power to grant a
release on bail, holding that the right to bail is dependent on statute
and that only the Attorney General is vested with statutory power to
permit enlargement on bail in deportation cases. 4 1 Other jurists, however, proceed on the assumption that they have inherent power to
award the privilege of bail, and that it is within the discretion of the
court to grant such privilege in meritorious cases.' There appears to
be general agreement, however, that bail may be permitted while an
appeal is pending, particularly if such appeal is by the government. 4
Having already discussed habeas corpus as an avenue for challenging administrative deportation orders, let us now consider injunctive
relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act and review under
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.
Before the enactment of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
of June 11, 1946, 44 the only procedure for obtaining judicial review was
by habeas corpus. However, deportation was successfully resisted in
1939, when, in Perkins v. Elg,45 the complainant litigated an erroneous
determination of her status of American citizenship in an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief. Such right to a judicial hearing on
the claim of citizenship had been recognized as early as 1922 in Ng
Fung Ho v. White.4 6
All of the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, with
the exception of sections 7, 8, and 11, became effective on September 11,
1946, three months after the date of approval. Sections 7 and 8, the
formal provisions as to hearing and decision, became effective on
December 11, 1946, six months after the date of approval. Although
the act doesn't say so expressly, it would seem that subsection (c) of
section 5 relating to separation of functions became operative also on
December 11, 1946, by reason of the fact that its provisions cover the
conduct of officers presiding at hearings under section 7.
41. United States ex rel. Carapa v. Curran, 297 Fed. 946 (2d Cir. 1924) ; Bongiovanni v. Ward, 50 F. Supp. 3 (D. Mass 1943) ; Ex parte Perkov, 45 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.
Cal. 1942) ; In re Hanoff, 39 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Cal. 1941) ; United States v. Pizzarusso, 28 F. Supp. 158 (D. Conn. 1939).
42. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745
(8th Cir. 1915) ; Wah v. Colwell, 187 Fed. 592 (9th Cir. 1911) ; Principe v. Ault, 62

F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Ohio 1945) ; In re Lum Poy, 128 Fed. 974 (D. Mont. 1904).
43. U.S. SuP. CT. RULt 45; 28 U.S.C. § 464 (1952) ; United States ex rel. Hen v.
Sisson, 220 Fed. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); United States v. Yet, 192 Fed. 577 (D.N.J.
1911); United States v. Chung, 132 Fed. 109 (S.D. Ga. 1904).

44. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1946).
45. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
46. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
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In 1950, the United States Supreme Court, in Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath,4 7 declared that deportation hearings came within the scope
of the Administrative Procedure Act sections providing formal requirements and a separation of functions. The majority of the court gave
no weight to the argument that to apply the act would cause inconvenience and added expense to the Immigration Service. As a consequence of the decision, pending hearings and many cases already
decided were ordered reopened and retried administratively. In the
same year, contemporaneous with the Sung case, the United States
Supreme Court decided, in McGrath v. Kristensen,48 that an erroneous
determination of eligibility for statutory relief from deportation was
subject to review under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of
June 25, 1948,"0 because it presented an actual controversy between
the alien and the immigration officials over the alien's legal right to
remedial relief from deportation.
To offset the impact of the Sung decision, Congress, in a rider to
the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1951," declared deportation
proceedings exempt from the requirements of sections 5, 7, and 8 of the
Administrative Procedure Act. Then, in Heikkila v. Barber "' the
United States Supreme Court held that section 19 of the Immigration
Act of February 5, 1917, which governed the deportation order in this
proceeding, "clearly had the effect of precluding judicial intervention in
deportation cases except insofar as it was required by the Constitution,"
that is to say, except by habeas corpus. It is to be here noted that the
Heikkila proceeding was instituted before December 24, 1952, the
effective date of the McCarran-Walter Omnibus Immigration and
Nationality Act of June 27, 1952.5' The effect of the decision was to
narrow the scope of judicial inquiry to what it had been before the
decision in the Sung case.
Since the 1952 act has been in effect, the courts have been in
accord that the judicial review provided therein is not synonymous
with habeas corpus but is assimilated to the scope of inquiry expressed
in the Administrative Procedure Act. In 1955, the United States
Supreme Court declared, in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,53 that the Administrative Procedure Act applies in deportation proceedings instituted
47. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
48. 340 U.S. 162 (1950).
49. 62 STAT. 964 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1952).
50. 64 STAT. 1048 (1950), 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1950).
51. 345 U.S. 229, 234-235 (1953).
52. 66 STAT. 173, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952).
53. 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
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under the 1952 act, and that the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization is not an indispensable party. The Court reasoned that
since the orders of the District Director are final under the regulations,
it seems highly appropriate that the one charged with enforcement of
such orders should represent the government's interest and that there
is no adequate reason to subject the alien to the burden and expense
of traveling to the District of Columbia with his witnesses, in order to
contest his deportation.
In a series of decisions handed down by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit on October 13, 1955, it was held that
judicial review of deportation orders issued before December 24, 1952
was available where the complaints for review had been filed after that
date " and that the legality of an exclusion order issued before December 24, 1952, may be challenged either by habeas corpus or review
under the Administrative Procedure Act, if the complaint was filed after
the effective date of the 1952 act. 5 It is revealing to note the rationale
of the Supreme Court in the We Shung " case:
"It may be that habeas corpus is a far more expeditious
remedy than that of declaratory judgment, as the experience of
Shung may indicate. But that fact may be weighed by the alien
against the necessity of arrest and detention after which he may
make his choice of the form of action he wishes to use in challenging his exclusion. In either case, the scope of the review is that
of existing law."
Following the reasoning in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, the United
States Supreme Court, on March 11, 1957, declared in Ceballos v.
Shaughnessy 5 that neither the Attorney General nor the Commissioner
of Immigration is a necessary party to an alien's suit for a judgment
declaring him eligible for suspension of deportation and restraining the
District Director from taking him into custody for deportation. The
Court reasoned that the District Director is the official who would
execute the order of deportation; hence, he is a sufficient party defendant.
The courts have no power to review administrative discretion
when it is reasonably exercised."8 But, in appropriate circumstances,
54. Trilivas v. Brownell, 227 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Pagano v. Brownell, 227
F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Miyagi v. Brownell, 227 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Muscardin v. Brownell, 227 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
55. We Shung v. Brownell, 227 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aff'd, 352 U.S. 180
(1956) ; Estevez v. Brownell, 227 F.2d 38 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
56. 352 U.S. 180, 186 (1956).
57. 352 U.S. 599 (1957).
58. United States ex rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, 166 F.2d 369, 373 (2d Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948).
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they can compel correction of an abuse of discretion or compel an
official to exercise his discretion where he has obviously failed or
refused to do so." Furthermore, the courts may not interfere with
administrative determinations unless upon the record the proceedings
were manifestly unfair or substantial evidence to support the finding is
lacking, or the evidence reflects manifest abuse of discretion.'
It is
the general attitude of the judiciary not to interfere with a discretionary
act by the Attorney General,"' except for a refusal to exercise discretion
or for taking action founded on an improper legal basis,' or for failure
to observe due process.'
Obviously, the courts are without power to substitute their discretion for that of the Attorney General in whom the power is vested
by statute. But, to carry out the Congressional intent, the statute
64
must be given a reasonable construction.
A resident alien is entitled to due process of law,6" since deporta6
tion is equivalent to punishment or exile.
Section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides:

"So far as necessary to decision . . . the reviewing court
shall . . . (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . (5) unsupported by
substantial evidence . . . or (6) unwarranted by the facts.
. . . In making the foregoing determinations the court shall

review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited
by any party.

.

It follows that the scope of judicial inquiry under the Administrative
Procedure Act encompasses a review of the entire record.
Before concluding, we should like to discuss some areas in which
the courts have defined the scope of their inquiry.

A basic principle of our administrative law is that of exclusiveness
of the record. Under that principle, the agency's decision must be based
59. Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1950).
60. United States ex rel. Adamantides v. Neelly, 191 F.2d 997, 1000 (7th Cir.

1951).
61. Caddeo v. McGranery, 202 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; United States ex rel.
Ciannamea v. Nealy, 202 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1953) ; United States ex rel. Kaloudis v.
Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950).
62. McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950) ; Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy,
180 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1950).
63. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955); Arakas
v. Zimmerman, 200 F.2d 322 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Alexiou v. McGrath, 101 F. Supp. 421
(D.D.C. 1951) ; 8 C.F.R. § 244.3 (1952).
64. Perri v. Dulles, 206 F.2d 586-91 (3d Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Ricketts, 165
F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1947) ; Gualco v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 760-67 (N.D. Cal. 1952);
Repetto v. Acheson, 94 F. Supp. 623-25 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
65. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
66. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948).
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exclusively on materials contained in the public record which both
sides know about and have a chance to rebut. More and more in
recent years, however, adherence to this rudiment of administrative
justice has given way in areas deemed to be affected by considerations
of national security. The Supreme Court has not been quick to censure
these deformities in agency procedure. On the contrary, where the
point has been squarely presented to it, the Court has found means to
rationalize these departures from the fundamentals of fair play.
The most recent case of this type is Jay v. Boyd."e It arose under
the Immigration Act which provides that the Attorney General "may
in his discretion" suspend deportation of any deportable alien fulfilling
certain statutory requirements relating to moral character, hardship, and
period of residence in this country. Suspension of deportation had been
denied Jay on the basis of certain confidential information, which was
not revealed to him at the administrative hearing. On appeal to the
courts, he urged that the regulation authorizing reliance upon such
secret evidence was invalid. The Supreme Court rejected this claim.
Notwithstanding this decision, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida held in 1956, in United States ex rel.
Kasel de Paglierav. Savorettif that aliens seeking entry in an exclusion
proceeding, had a right to present written statements and accompanying
information which had to be considered by the agency as well as a
right to be informed of the reasons why they were being excluded. It
is recognized that the decision goes beyond the prior cases on the
subject, which have drawn a sharp distinction between deportation and
exclusion, holding the latter not subject to the demands of due process.
However, this distinction is an illogical one which has been sharply
criticized. Compare United States ex rel. Nicoloff v. Shaughnessy,6 9
holding that before an alien could be finally excluded on the basis that
he would prejudice the public interest or endanger national security,
he was entitled to submit a written statement and accompanying information.
On the question of "fair hearing," the District Court for the
Southern District of California, in Fausto v. Brownell,7" decided in
1956, strongly condemned the administrative procedure at a Board of
Special Inquiry Hearing involving the question of citizenship. In this
case one member of the board was the twenty-one year old secretary of
67. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
68. 139 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
69. 139 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Cf. Petrovicz v. Holland, 142 F. Supp. 369
(E.D. Pa. 1956).
70. 140 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
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the chairman, the second member was not present at the hearing, and
the third member acted as chairman and interrogator. Since the alien
spoke no English and only the chairman understood Spanish he also
acted as translator and interpreter. Under the immigration law, Boards
of Inquiry are required to be composed of three members. The court
declared that this is the sort of "administrative procedure" which
caused investigation in Congress relative to administrative agencies
constituting themselves prosecutors, juries, and judges at one and the

same time. This is the activity condemned by the Supreme Court in
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath.7 '
Section 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
provides the right to counsel of the alien's own choice, employed at
his own expense, so long as such counsel is one regularly enrolled on
the roster of attorneys authorized to practice before the Board of
Immigration Appeals.
United States v. Minker 72 illustrates the fact that agencies possess
powers of subpoena only to the extent to which those powers are
delegated to them. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
empowers immigration officers to subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses in any immigration proceeding. The question at
issue in this case was whether this section empowered an immigration
officer to subpoena a naturalized citizen who was the subject of an
inquiry by the Service. It was held that his testimony could not be
compelled. However, in United States v. Zuskar, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held, in 1956," in a case arising out of proceedings by the United States to compel two naturalized citizens to testify
before Immigration investigators concerning two other named persons,
that the Minker rule did not apply, even though one of the defendants
claimed that he might be the subject of inquiry by the Service.
Nevertheless, it would seem from the dictum that the courts would not
compel the testimony of a naturalized citizen in a proceeding concerning
other named persons, if the evidence disclosed that the real purpose
behind the District Director's subpoena was to obtain the witness'
appearance in order to secure testimony adverse to the witness.
In summary, it may be said that to meet the standard of due
process of law in exclusion or deportation cases there must be a fair
administrative hearing and substantial evidence of probative value to
support a finding of excludability or deportability.
71. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
72. 350 U.S. 179 (1956).
73. 237 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1956).
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Administrative orders of exclusion or deportation may now be
challenged judicially either by habeas corpus, declaratory judgment, or
review under the Administrative Procedure Act; and all three forms of
proceeding may be instituted in the same action, if the alien is in the
custody of the Immigration Service. Otherwise, he may file a complaint for declaratory judgment and petition for review under the
Administrative Procedure Act, in one action to test the order of deportation.
The vast expansion in administrative authority caused by the war
and postwar emergencies has led people on both sides of the partisan
political boundary to realize the need for safeguards. Extremists on
both sides have moved toward the middle; and it may be said that the
procedural safeguards imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act
have not, despite fears which were expressed to the contrary, really
interfered with the effective functioning of the administrative process.
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